Presentations
Please review the class schedule and select four papers from the list of topics in each class. Once you’ve identified your papers, note your selection and date on the Presentations tab of our shared Google Sheet (available on Canvas). Please note your selections no later than January 16, and please ensure no more than one student is signed up to present on any given day.
Your presentation should be around 60 minutes, following a standard seminar setup. Please also prepare two discussion questions to lead a 10-15 minute discussion after your presentation. Please submit your presentations via Canvas prior to your in-class time.
Your presentation should be no more than 50 slides (including a title slide and your discussion questions at the end). Each presentation is worth 5 points toward your final grade, with one point allocated to each of the following categories:
- Presentation length: You must stick to the 60 minute presentation length (including questions but not including the final discussion)
- Slide layout: slides should be clear and concise, with minimal text
- Presentation clarity: the presentation should be clear and well-organized, with a clear description of the research question, data, empirical analysis, and results
- Figures and Tables: your presentation must have at least 5 figures.
- Discussion questions: the discussion questions should be clear and thought-provoking. Please conclude your presentation with a final slide listing these questions.
Note that a presentation is not just a re-hashing of the paper in slide form. A good academic presentation should have as little text as possible on each slide, and the content on the slides doesn’t necessarily need to follow that of the paper. For example, in a real-time environment, it is much easier to move between different aspects of the empirical analysis and data. Below are lists of candidate papers for presentation for each module. These are also listed in the shared spreadsheet (on Canvas) from which you can formally indicate your selections.
In addition to these 4 graded presentations, I expect everyone to present and discuss recent job market papers toward the end of the semester (Module 6). While ungraded, these JMP presentations will help everyone better understand the quality and rigor of recent top job market papers in our field.
Module 1: Insurance
| Paper | Main theme |
|---|---|
| Aron-Dine, Einav, and Finkelstein (2013) | Moral hazard and utilization responses |
| Finkelstein et al. (2012) | Medicaid coverage and health care use |
| Brot-Goldberg et al. (2023) | Choice frictions and defaults |
| Hu et al. (2018) | Financial protection and household debt |
| Miller, Johnson, and Wherry (2021) | Insurance coverage and mortality |
| Finkelstein, Hendren, and Luttmer (2019) | Welfare effects of Medicaid |
| Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010) | Empirical tests of adverse selection |
| Handel, Kolstad, and Spinnewijn (2019) | Inertia and policy interventions |
| Shepard (2022) | Provider networks and selection |
| Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan (2012) | Insurer concentration and premiums |
| Ho and Lee (2017) | Plan design and non-price competition |
| Cabral, Geruso, and Mahoney (2018) | Medicare Advantage incentives |
| Curto et al. (2021) | Competition in regulated insurance markets |
| Layton et al. (2019) | Public versus private insurance provision |
Module 2: Physician Agency
| Paper | Main theme |
|---|---|
| Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams (2016) | Provider incentives and patient outcomes |
| Badinski et al. (2023) | Physician decision-making under incentives |
| Iizuka (2012) | Financial incentives and prescribing |
| Clemens and Gottlieb (2014) | Physician supply responses to payment |
| Ho and Pakes (2014) | Organizational incentives and productivity |
| J. Currie, MacLeod, and Van Parys (2016) | Physician behavior and treatment choice |
| Molitor (2018) | Information frictions and treatment |
| Zeltzer (2020) | Referral networks and physician behavior |
| Martin Gaynor, Propper, and Seiler (2016) | Physician market power |
| Eliason et al. (2018) | Ownership incentives and care decisions |
| Gruber, Hoe, and Stoye (2023) | Treatment decisions and time constraints |
Module 3: Learning
| Paper | Main theme |
|---|---|
| Ching, Erdem, and Keane (2013) | Bayesian learning by physicians |
| Chan, Narasimhan, and Xie (2013) | Dynamic learning and treatment choice |
| Gong (2018) | Peer effects in learning |
| Comin, Skinner, and Staiger (2022) | Diffusion of medical technologies |
| Coscelli and Shum (2004) | Physician learning with spillovers |
| Crawford and Shum (2005) | Learning and demand dynamics |
| J. M. Currie and MacLeod (2020) | Learning and quality improvement |
| Agha and Molitor (2018) | Learning from referrals |
| Dubois and Tuncel (2021) | Learning and pharmaceutical adoption |
| Dickstein (2018) | Learning and clinical practice variation |
Module 4: Competition
| Paper | Main theme |
|---|---|
| Martin Gaynor and Vogt (2003) | Price competition in hospital markets |
| M. Gaynor, Ho, and Town (2015) | Review of competition in health care |
| Kessler and McClellan (2000) | Competition and treatment outcomes |
| Dafny (2009) | Hospital mergers and prices |
| Martin Gaynor, Moreno-Serra, and Propper (2013) | Competition and quality effects |
| Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015) | Structural bargaining models |
| M. Lewis and Pflum (2015) | Insurer–provider negotiations |
| Ho and Lee (2019) | Network formation and competition |
| Dafny, Ho, and Lee (2019) | Cross-market mergers |
| Schmitt (2018) | Multimarket contact |
| M. S. Lewis and Pflum (2017) | Hospital bargaining power |
| Cuesta, Noton, and Vatter (2019) | Vertical integration effects |
| Koch, Wendling, and Wilson (2021) | Physician–hospital integration |
| Capps, Dranove, and Ody (2018) | Hospital consolidation impacts |
Module 5: Disclosure
| Paper | Main theme |
|---|---|
| Dranove and Jin (2010) | Quality disclosure and incentives |
| Luco (2019) | Transparency and pricing behavior |
| Dranove et al. (2003) | Report cards and provider response |
| Kolstad (2013) | Information and patient choice |
| Epstein (2010) | Public reporting and quality |
| Jin and Sorensen (2006) | Disclosure and market outcomes |
| Darden and McCarthy (2015) | Information and provider behavior |
| Grennan and Swanson (2020) | Price transparency and negotiation |
| Christensen, Floyd, and Maffett (2020) | Disclosure and health care prices |
| Brown (2019) | Consumer responses to transparency |